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Abstract
We study whether monetary policy should target the exchange rate in a two-
country model with non-atomistic wage setters, non-traded goods and different degrees
of exchange-rate pass through. Commitment to an exchange rate target reduces the
labor market distortion. Large labor unions anticipate that higher wages depreciate
the exchange rate, which triggers an increase in the interest rate and restrain wage
demands. However, reduced exchange rate flexibility worsens the distortion stemming
from preset pricing. Targeting the nominal exchange rate will be optimal when the
labor market distortion is larger than the preset-pricing one. This result arises with
cooperation both under producer and local currency pricing, even though the optimal
degree of exchange-rate targeting is higher under local currency pricing. In the Nash
equilibrium, the terms-of-trade effect raises optimal wage mark-ups thereby reducing
the optimal weight on the exchange rate target. The terms-of-trade effect is stronger
as openness and substitutability among Home and Foreign goods increase.
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1 Introduction
Inflation targeting is becoming the norm for monetary policy and interest rate rules are sim-
plified descriptions of how central banks operate. The question we ask is whether monetary
policy should explicitly target the nominal exchange rate in addition to targeting producer
price inflation (PPI) and a measure of resource utilization such as the output gap.
We address this question in an open-economy two-country model with non-traded goods,
productivity shocks, preset pricing and different degrees of exchange-rate pass through: pro-
ducer currency pricing (PCP) and local currency pricing (LCP). Monetary policy is commit-
ted and it follows an interest rate rule that allows for exchange-rate targeting. The novelty
of our work is to introduce collective wage bargaining through non-atomistic unions, i.e.
unions that are large enough to internalize the effect of their own wages on the aggregate
wage level.1
We find that the optimal interest rate rule may require exchange-rate targeting. On one
hand, exchange-rate targeting restrains wages and reduces labor market distortions in our
model. On the other hand, it reduces the flexibility of the exchange rate, which is needed
in the presence of non-traded goods. If labor market distortions are large – and larger than
the distortion stemming from preset pricing – exchange-rate targeting is optimal within the
interest-rate rules analyzed here. We also find that the optimal degree of exchange-rate
targeting, namely the weight assigned to the exchange rate target in the interest rate rule,
is larger under LCP than PCP.
Since targeting the exchange rate implies reducing its flexibility, our paper is closely
related to the literature on the optimality of exchange rate regimes. According to this
literature, the case for exchange rate flexibility is based on the need to cushion national
economies from real idiosyncratic shocks in a world where nominal prices adjust slowly while
pass-through is rapid. Intuitively, freely floating exchange rates permit a rapid adjustment
of relative prices even though the nominal prices have not changed much. A large body
of empirical evidence, however, suggests that the degree of exchange rate pass-through is
far from complete in the short run and departures from the law of one price are large and
persistent (see, for example, Engel and Rogers, 1996; Goldberg and Knetter, 1997; Goldberg
and Campa, 2005).
One reason why complete pass-through and PCP fail to describe reality well is that firms
preset prices in the currency of the markets where they sell their goods (e.g. Betts and
Devereux, 2000; Devereux and Engel, 2003). In such case, exchange rate flexibility may
not be desirable after all. Devereux and Engel (2003) study the optimal degree of exchange
rate flexibility under PCP and LCP. They consider a two-country model where all goods
are traded internationally, with country-specific productivity shocks, preset prices and a
central bank that can commit to a monetary rule. They find that the optimal monetary
rule is consistent with fully flexible exchange rates under PCP but with fixed exchange rates
1Wage determination in most OECD countries is structured in collective bargaining between employers
and trade unions at the plant, firm, industry or aggregate level (see Nickell, Nunziata, and Ochel, 2005;
International Labour Office 2008).
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under LCP. Under PCP, domestic monetary policy can be used to achieve the flexible price
equilibrium for the goods produced at home while foreign monetary policy does the same
for foreign-produced goods. The exchange rate must be flexible to ensure that the flexible
price equilibrium can emerge in such setting.
Under LCP, on the other hand, prices are set in consumers’ currencies so that the CPI
is unaffected by the exchange rate – as a matter of fact, the CPI is completely preset. This
implies that the terms of trade is constant and it does not influence demand or employment.
Another way of understanding this result is to think of the Backus-Smith condition stating
that the ratio of the marginal utilities of consumption at home and abroad is equal to the
inverse of the real exchange rate in equilibrium. When consumer price indices are constant,
the marginal utility ratio is constant when the exchange rate is also constant. Hence, the
optimal degree of exchange rate flexibility depends on the degree of exchange rate pass-
through.
Duarte and Obstfeld (2008) find that flexible exchange rates are optimal with LCP. Non-
traded goods are introduced in the same setting of Devereux and Engel (2003) and this
brings back the need for exchange rate flexibility. With non-traded goods, an idiosyncratic
technological shock generates divergent consumption movements that need to be supported
by exchange rate movements. At the same time, exchange rate movements are necessary to
guarantee risk sharing with nominally complete asset markets.
Our paper reconsiders the optimal degree of exchange rate flexibility in the setting of
Duarte and Obstfeld (2008) augmented by distortions in the labor market. In our model,
the need for exchange rate flexibility stemming from the presence of non-traded goods must
be balanced against the need to target exchange rates to reduce labor market distortions.
The literature on optimal monetary policy in New Open Economy Macroeconomics is
large. Some of these works focus on environments with PCP and show that a policy pursuing
domestic price stability can be optimal or close to the first best.2 A number of papers have
analyzed monetary policy in the presence of imperfect exchange rate pass-through. For
example Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) and Sutherland (2005) introduce a variable degree
of exchange rate pass-through and demonstrate that optimal monetary rules are no longer
inward-looking. We depart from their work by introducing non-atomistic wage setters. Smets
and Wouters (2002) and Monacelli (2005) analyze optimal monetary policy with intermediate
pass-through, but they focus on a small open economy.
Engel (2009) studies optimal discretionary, cooperative monetary policy in a two-country
economy a` la Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (2002) with LCP. He finds that optimal monetary
policy should target currency misalignments. More precisely, the targeting rule for monetary
policy involves CPI rather than PPI inflation. Our work shares with Engel (2009) the
environment with LCP and price rigidities,3 while it differs by introducing large wage setters
and by focusing on optimal committed interest rate rules. Like Engel, we find that monetary
2See Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (1999), Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002) and Benigno
and Benigno (2003), to cite a few.
3Engel (2009) features sticky prices a` la Calvo while we assume price setting is synchronized with prices
set one period in advance.
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policy should respond to the exchange rate, but the channel is different. In our model, the
reason to target the exchange rate is to discipline wage setters and reduce labor market
distortions; in Engel, the reason is to eliminate the inefficient allocations stemming from
currency misalignment.
Benigno and Benigno (2008) analyze the determinacy and dynamics of the nominal ex-
change rate under alternative interest rate rules in an environment with PCP. More precisely,
they consider three alternative regimes – fixed, floating and managed exchange rate – and
design interest rate rules that are consistent with these regimes. They find that the nom-
inal exchange rate displays a unit root behavior under the floating exchange rate regime
where the interest rate responds to the inflation rate. Benigno (2004) focuses on a model
with LCP to study how interest rate rules for monetary policy affect the persistence of the
real exchange rate. Woodford (2007) proposes a simplified version of the model in Benigno
(2004), based on the framework in Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler’s (2002), to assess the effect
of domestic monetary policy on domestic aggregate demand and domestic inflation under
different degree of openness. All these works, do not ask whether monetary policy is optimal.
Our paper is also related to a large literature that considers the role of large unions and
their impact on optimal monetary policy.4 This literature considers simple strategic games
between the government and organized labor unions and it is based on one of two alternative
assumptions: (i) unions care about inflation, following Cubitt (1992) and Skott (1997); (ii)
unions care about employment and real wages, following Soskice and Iversen (1998, 2000)
and Bratsiotis and Martin (1999). Moreover, these models are deterministic and/or static.
Gnocchi (2006) studies optimal interest rate rules in a New Keynesian model in the
presence of non-atomistic unions. He finds that it is indeed optimal to pursue more aggressive
inflation stabilization policies when labor markets are concentrated, as tougher stabilization
policies induce more wage restraint and bring the level output closer to its efficient level.
We depart from his work in two ways. First, by considering an open economy. Second, by
allowing the interest rate rule to be an explicit function of the exchange rate.5
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
Section 3 solves for the equilibrium with flexible prices. Section 4 solves for the equilibrium
with preset prices and Section 5 analyzes optimal monetary policy when prices are preset.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
For simplicity, we follow the notation of Duarte and Obstfeld (2008). The economy consists
of two ex-ante equally-sized countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F ), inhabited by a continuum
of agents (with population size normalized to 1) and a finite number of unions. In monop-
olistic competitive markets, firms produce tradable goods (H ∈ [0, 1] and F ∈ [1, 2]) and a
4See Calmfors (2001) and Cukierman (2002) for extensive surveys of this literature.
5Cuciniello (2008, 2009) focuses on the time-consistent monetary policy in presence of non-atomistic wage
setters by introducing an open-economy dimension in Lippi’s (2003) framework.
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continuum of non-tradable goods indexed by N ∈ [0, 1] in the Home country and N∗ ∈ [0, 1]
in the Foreign country. Production of the Home (Foreign) goods requires a continuum of
differentiated labor inputs indexed by [0, 1]. Each worker acts as a monopolistic supplier of
a particular labor service to both non tradable and tradable sectors.
Under the PCP specification the Home central bank sets the nominal interest rate ac-
cording to the following rule
ιt = ι¯+ ψpHt + χ(et − Et−1et), (1)
where ιt ≡ log(1 + it) is the log of nominal interest earned between dates t and t + 1,
pH ≡ logPH is the log
6 of Home PPI in domestic currency, et is the log exchange rate (Home
currency price of Foreign currency) and Et−1et is its expectation based on information at
time t− 1. u is a normally distributed shocks with mean of zero and variance σ2u.
Equation (1) is a Taylor-type rule that targets the PPI and the nominal exchange rate. We
assume that the weight on the exchange rate target is positive and finite, namely 0 ≤ χ <∞.
When χ = 0 monetary policy does not target the exchange rate, which is freely floating. As
χ increases, the interest rate responds more aggressively to changes in the exchange rate.
We refer to this regime as“managed floating,” as exchange rate flexibility is reduced in this
case. We allow for χ to become arbitrarily large and therefore for exchange rate to approach
a fixed exchange rate regime, but do not consider the case where χ is infinite. In fact, the
interest rate rules (1) and (2) do not constitute a fixed exchange rate regime as χ→∞.
The Foreign central bank has similar rule,
ι∗t = ι¯+ ψ
∗p∗Ft − χ
∗(et − Et−1et), (2)
where ι∗t ≡ log(1 + i
∗
t ) and p
∗
F expresses Foreign-currency PPI.
Under the LCP specification the interest rate rules are identical to (1) and (2), except
they target CPI rather than PPI:
ιt = ι¯+ ψpt + χ(et − Et−1et) ι
∗
t = ι¯+ ψ
∗p∗t − χ
∗(et − Et−1et), (3)
where p and p∗ respectively express Home- and Foreign-currency CPI, respectively.
2.1 Households
Preferences of the representative Home agent z ∈ [0, 1] are defined over consumption C and
labor supplied L:
U0(z) = E0
{
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
(Ct(z))
1−ρ
1− ρ
− kLt(z)
]}
, (4)
where ρ > 0 and β ∈ (0, 1). For any person z the overall consumption index C is a Cobb-
Douglas aggregate of the tradable and non-tradable composite goods, given by
C =
CγTC
1−γ
N
γγ(1− γ)1−γ
,
6Henceforth lower-case letters, except for interest rates, will denote natural logarithms.
6
where the tradable goods subindex CT is given by
CT = 2C
1
2
HC
1
2
F , (5)
and CH , CF and CN are CES aggregators of the available varieties,
Cj =
[∫ 1
0
Cj(i)
θ−1
θ di
] θ
θ−1
θ > 1, j ∈ [H,F,N ].7
The consumption-based price index expressed in domestic currency is defined as
P = P γTP
1−γ
N , (6)
with
PT = P
1
2
HP
1
2
F
and
Pj =


[∫ 1
0
Pj(i)
1−θdi
] 1
1−θ
, j = H,N[∫ 2
1
Pj(i)
1−θdi
] 1
1−θ
, j = F.
Each z-th individual trades state-contingent nominal bonds denominated in the Home cur-
rency. We denote the price at date t when the state of the world is st of a bond paying one
unit of Home currency at date t+1 if the state of the world is st+1 by Qst+1|st . The quantity
of these bonds purchased by the Home agent z at date t is Bst+1, while revenues received
at date t when the state of the world is st are denoted by Bst . Firm’s profits are entirely
redistributed as dividends among domestic agents.
A typical Home agent z faces the following budget constraint in nominal terms
∑
st+1
Qst+1|stBst+1(z)+PtCt(z) = Bst(z)+PtTt(z)+Wt(z)Lt(z)+
∫ 1
0
[ΠH,t(i, z)+ΠN,t(i, z)]di,
(7)
where
L(z) ≡
∫ 1
0
[LH(i, z) + LN(i, z)]di,
Πj(i) denotes nominal dividends received from firm i operating in sector j ∈ [H,N ] and
T (z) are per capita lump-sum real transfers from the Home government. Individuals take
firm behavior and lump-sum transfers as given. Foreign individuals face isomorphic budget
constraints (with * denoting Foreign variables).
The optimal intra-temporal allocation of consumption of Home and Foreign tradable
varieties and the non-traded varieties yields the following demands for the i-th domestic
7For j = F , the integration is over the interval [1,2].
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firm:
CH(i) =
γ
2
(
PH(i)
PH
)−θ (
PH
PT
)−1(
PT
P
)−1
C, (8)
C∗H(i) =
γ
2
(
P ∗H(i)
P ∗H
)−θ (
P ∗H
P ∗T
)−1(
P ∗T
P ∗
)−1
C∗, (9)
CN(i) = (1− γ)
(
PN(i)
PN
)−θ (
PN
P
)−1
C. (10)
The inter-temporal Euler equation is given by
C−ρt
Pt
= (1 + it)βEt
{
C−ρt+1
Pt+1
}
(11)
in the Home country. A symmetric equation holds in the Foreign country.
Since markets are complete in claims on future money payments, the ex-post allocation
satisfies the Backus and Smith’s (1993) condition
C−ρt
Pt
=
(C∗t )
−ρ
EtP ∗t
, (12)
where E is the exchange rate (domestic price of foreign currency). Note the purchasing-
power-parity condition need not hold in the model ex post because of non-traded goods. As
a result, the marginal utilities of consumption are not necessarily equated among countries.
2.2 Firms
Let Yj(i) denote the level of output produced by the monopolistically competitive firm i
and supplied to the Home tradable market (j = H) or to the Home non-tradable market
(j = N). Technology is described by the following production functions:
Yj,t(i) = AtLj,t(i) j ∈ [N,H ], (13)
where A is an economy-wide productivity shock whose stochastic process in log-terms is
given by:
at = λat−1 + ut, (14)
with λ ∈ [0, 1], and Lj(i) is a labor index defined as a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of the quantities
hired of each differentiated labor type z:
Lj,t(i) =
[∫ 1
0
Lj,t(i, z)
σ−1
σ dz
] σ
σ−1
j ∈ [N,H ], σ > 1.8 (15)
8A symmetric production function holds in the Foreign country with the productivity shock a∗
t
= λa∗
t−1
+
u∗
t
.
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For a given level of production, demands of labor type z by producer i solve the dual
problem of minimizing total cost,
∫ 1
0
W (z)L(i, z)dz, subject to the employment index (15):
Lj,t(i, z) =
[
Wt(z)
Wt
]−σ
Lj,t(i), (16)
where W (z) denotes the nominal wage of labor type z and W is the nominal wage index
defined as
Wt =
[∫ 1
0
Wt(z)
1−σdz
] 1
1−σ
. (17)
Firms set nominal prices one period in advance. As in Devereux and Engel (2003), we
allow two different price-setting specifications. Under the PCP specification, Home firms
producing traded goods choose a single price in domestic currency so as to maximize the
state-contingent value of profits:
max
PHt(i)
Et−1 [dt ((PHt(i)−Wt/At)(CHt(i) + C
∗
Ht(i)))] , (18)
subject to the demand functions (8) and (9). In equilibrium, the pricing kernel dt is given
by β
C−ρt Pt−1
C−ρt−1Pt
.
Under the LCP specification, firms can choose two different prices: one to charge Home
residents, and one to charge Foreign residents. Thus, the Home producer of Y ∗H(i), YH(i)
sells the former to the Foreign market at the Foreign-currency price P ∗H(i) and the latter
to the Home market at the Home-currency price PH(i). Specifically, Home firms producing
traded goods solve the following problem:
max
PHt(i),P
∗
Ht
(i)
Et−1
[
dt
(
PHt(i)CHt(i) + EtP
∗
Ht(i)C
∗
Ht(i)−
Wt
At
(CHt(i) + C
∗
Ht(i))
)]
, (19)
subject to the demand functions (8) and (9).
The Home firms producing non-traded goods choose a single price in domestic currency
and their maximization problem is similar to (18) both under PCP and LCP.
Consider first domestic price setting. Under either specification, the optimal price set by
Home firms selling in the Home market is given by
P PCPHt (i) = P
PCP
Ht = P
LCP
Ht = PNt =
θ
θ − 1
Et−1
[
C1−ρt
Wt
At
]
Et−1
[
C1−ρt
] . (20)
Conversely, the optimal price set in the Foreign market is different under the two specifica-
tions. With PCP the law of one price holds and the price set by Home firms is
P ∗PCPHt (i) = P
∗PCP
Ht = P
PCP
Ht /Et. (21)
9
With LCP the solution to (19) is given by
P ∗LCPHt (i) = P
∗LCP
Ht =
θ
θ − 1
Et−1
[
C∗1−ρt
Wt
AtEt
]
Et−1
[
C∗1−ρt
] . (22)
Similarly, Foreign firms selling in the Foreign market choose
P ∗PCPFt (i
∗) = P ∗PCPFt = P
∗LCP
Ft = P
∗
Nt =
θ
θ − 1
Et−1
[
C∗1−ρt
W ∗t
A∗t
]
Et−1
[
C∗1−ρt
] , (23)
while Foreign firms selling in the Home market choose
P PCPFt (i
∗) = P PCPFt = EtP
∗PCP
Ft (24)
under the PCP specification, and
PLCPFt (i
∗) = PLCPFt =
θ
θ − 1
Et−1
[
EtC
1−ρ
t
W ∗t
A∗t
]
Et−1
[
C1−ρt
] , (25)
under the LCP specification.
3 The Equilibrium with Flexible Prices
In this section we consider the flexible-price case. We assume that Home and Foreign workers
are organized in n = n∗ > 1 labor unions. All labor types are unionized and equally
distributed among unions. Therefore, each union x has mass 1/n =
∫
z∈x
dz and each union’s
ability to internalize the consequences of its own actions is proportional to union size: the
larger the union, the more it internalizes the impact of its wage settlement on aggregate
wage. In choosing the nominal wage W (x), union x anticipates that (see Appendix A)
∂W
∂W (x)
=
1
n
(
W (x)
W
)−σ
, (26)
taking other unions’ wages both at Home and abroad as given.
When price are flexible, (20), (23), (22), and (25) simplify to
PHt = P
∗
HtEt = PNt =
θ
θ − 1
Wt
At
, (27)
P ∗Ft =
PFt
Et
= P ∗Nt =
θ
θ − 1
W ∗t
A∗t
, (28)
and the law of one price holds for traded goods. Combining (27) and (28) yields an expression
for the exchange rate
Et =Wt/W
∗
t . (29)
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As long as n is finite, an increase in union’s wage is perceived to affect aggregate wage
that, in turn, affects the nominal exchange rate. In a symmetric equilibrium (W (x) = W ),
the elasticity of domestic demand for labor type x and the elasticity of CPI to wage x are
respectively given by (see Appendix B)
ZFLl ≡ −
∂ logL(x)
∂ logW (x)
= σ
(
1−
1
n
)
+ ZFLL
1
n
, where ZFLL ≡ −
∂ logL
∂ logW
=
1 + ψ + χ
ρ
, (30)
ZFLp ≡
∂ logP
∂ logW (x)
=
1
n
, (31)
from which we derive the labor-type elasticity to real wage
δFL ≡ −
∂ logL(z)
∂ log(W (x)/P )
= σ +
1 + ψ + χ(
1− 1
n
)
ρ n
> 1. (32)
With atomistic wage setters (n→∞), only the elasticity of substitution between labor types
σ matters because unions do not internalize the impact on CPI and on aggregate employment
of their wage demands – ZFLp → 0 and Z
FL
L /n → 0 as n → ∞. It is worth noticing that
ZFLL is increasing in χ and ψ, the two parameters governing the interest rate response to
exchange rate and price level, respectively. A non-atomistic union anticipates that its wage
claims will trigger a higher interest rate, thereby reducing current consumption and aggregate
employment. The larger the weights χ and ψ, the stronger such effect on employment.
Each union aims at maximizing the utility (4) of its members9 subject to the budget
constraint (7) and labor demand (16). By symmetry in labor markets, the solution to
unions’ problem implies the following condition (Appendix C)
Wt
Pt
= k
δFL
δFL − 1
Cρt . (33)
Substituting the price level in the Home country (B.1) into the expression above, con-
sumption under flexible prices is given by:
Ct =
[(
θ − 1
θk
δFL − 1
δFL
)
A
1− γ
2
t (A
∗
t )
γ
2
] 1
ρ
. (34)
4 The Equilibrium with Predetermined Prices
In Appendix B.2 we show that the elasticity of labor demand and CPI to Home wage under
preset pricing are given by:
ZPRL ≡ −
∂ logLt
∂ logWt
=
ZPRE (2χ+ γ(1 + η(1 + γ(ρ− 1)− 2ρ)))
2ρ
, (35)
9The benevolent union hypothesis is consistent with the traditional labor union theory (see e.g. Oswald,
1985).
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ZPRp ≡
∂ logPt
∂ logWt(x)
=
γη
2n
ZPRE , (36)
where ZPRE is the elasticity of the exchange rate to the domestic nominal wage, which is
equation (B.13) in Appendix B.2, and η ∈ {0, 1} is the degree of exchange rate pass-through.
Specifically, if η = 1, exchange rate pass-through is complete and we are in the standard
case of PCP. If η = 0, exports are invoiced in the importer’s currency and exchange rate
pass-through is nil. This is LCP.
Aggregate labor demand elasticity ZPRL is increasing in χ, the weight on the exchange
rate target in the interest rate rule. The more aggressive the interest rate response to a
depreciation, the greater is aggregate labor demand elasticity. Non-atomistic unions know
that aggregate employment depends on aggregate demand, which in turn depends on con-
sumption and relative prices. They anticipate that an increase in their wage claims trigger
an increase in the interest rate in response to an increase in prices (this is the closed-economy
channel) and in response to a depreciation (this is the open-economy channel). But a higher
interest rate reduces consumption and aggregate labor demand. Appendix B presents the
mathematical derivations.
This mechanism is captured by the elasticity of demand for labor type x
ZPRl ≡ −
∂ logL(x)
∂ logW (x)
= σ
(
1−
1
n
)
+ ZPRL
1
n
. (37)
When n→∞ and wage setters are atomistic, unions do not internalize the impact of their
wage demands on aggregate wage and ZPRl reduces to the elasticity of substitution between
labor types, σ. When wage setters are non-atomistic, the aggregate labor demand elasticity
ZPRL matters with a weight that is increasing in union’s size. With a single all-encompassing
union (n = 1), the labor demand elasticity coincides with the aggregate one.
Assuming symmetry in labor markets, the first order condition under preset prices is10
Wt
Pt
= k
δPR
δPR − 1
Cρt , (38)
where
δPR ≡ −
∂ logLt(x)
∂ log(Wt(x)/Pt)
= ZPRl
∂ logWt(x)
∂ log(Wt(x)/Pt)
=
(
1− 1
n
)
σ
1−
γZPR
E
η
2n
+
ZPRE (χ+ γ/2(1 + η(1 + γ(ρ− 1)− 2ρ)))
n
(
1−
γZPR
E
η
2n
)
ρ
is the elasticity of the demand for labor type x to real wage. The ratio δPR/(δPR − 1) is
the wage mark-up over the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure.
In models without differentiated labor inputs, such mark-up is absent and the ratio is equal
10Appendix C gives the details of this derivation.
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to one. If labor inputs are differentiated but unions are atomistic, the mark-up boils down
to σ. In our model with non-atomistic unions, the mark-up becomes a function of χ, the
weight of the exchange rate in the interest rate rule.
It is worth noticing that the wage mark-up is higher, and therefore the labor market
distortion larger, under LCP. Intuitively, the CPI is predetermined under LCP and unions
directly control the real wage. Under PCP unions anticipate that real wage will increase
less than one-to-one with nominal wage and the exchange rate will depreciate to a larger
extent because ZPRE is larger. Non-atomistic unions anticipate this and restrain their wage
demands.
4.1 LCP specification
Under the LCP specification, i.e. when η = 0, and assuming log-normally distributed con-
sumption, we show in Appendix D that Home consumption innovation is given by
ct − Et−1ct =
λψ
ρ(1 + ψ − λ)
[(
1−
γ
2
)
ut +
γ
2
u∗t
]
−
1
ρ
(ιt − Et−1ιt), (39)
while innovations to Foreign consumption are
c∗t − Et−1c
∗
t =
λψ
ρ(1 + ψ − λ)
[(
1−
γ
2
)
u∗t +
γ
2
ut
]
−
1
ρ
(ι∗t − Et−1ι
∗
t ). (40)
As noted in Duarte and Obstfeld (2008), the presence of non-traded goods makes Home
and Foreign consumption depend on different combinations of Home and Foreign productiv-
ity shocks. As a result, exchange-rate innovations depend on productivity shocks. Using the
risk-sharing condition et = pt − p∗t + ρ(ct − c
∗
t ) we obtain (see Appendix D)
et − Et−1et = − [(ιt − ι
∗
t )− Et−1(ιt − ι
∗
t )] +
λψ(1− γ)
1 + ψ − λ
(ut − u
∗
t ). (41)
In the absence of non-traded goods (γ = 1), the exchange rate is not affected directly by
country-specific shocks. Finally, one can easily verify that the responses of interest rates to
technology shocks are given by
ιt − Et−1ιt =
χ(γΨ− (2− γ)Ψ∗)
2(1 + χ+ χ∗)
u∗t +
χ((2− γ)Ψ− γΨ∗)
2(1 + χ+ χ∗)
ut, (42)
ι∗t − Et−1ι
∗
t =
χ∗(γΨ∗ − (2− γ)Ψ)
2(1 + χ+ χ∗)
ut +
χ∗((2− γ)Ψ∗ − γΨ)
2(1 + χ+ χ∗)
u∗t , (43)
where Ψ ≡ λψ
1+ψ−λ
and Ψ∗ ≡ λψ
∗
1+ψ∗−λ
.
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4.2 PCP specification
With PCP pricing (η = 1), the law of one price holds for traded goods. Hence, from the
risk-sharing condition:
ρ[ct − Et−1ct − (c
∗
t − Et−1c
∗
t )] = (1− γ)(τt − Et−1τt) = (1− γ)(et − Et−1et), (44)
where τt ≡ et+ p∗Ft− pHt = pFt− pHt indicates the terms of trade. Unanticipated changes in
the exchange rate affect the real exchange rate and hence relative consumption levels. The
presence of non-traded goods implies that a change in the nominal exchange rate alters the
relative price of non-traded goods, which in our model corresponds to the terms of trade.
Exchange rate innovations are (see Appendix D):
et − Et−1et = ι
∗
t − Et−1ι
∗
t − (ιt − Et−1ιt) +
λψ
1 + ψ − λ
ut −
λψ∗
1 + ψ∗ − λ
u∗t , (45)
while Home and Foreign consumption innovations are
ρ(ct − Et−1ct) =
λψ
1 + ψ − λ
ut − (ιt − Et−1ιt)−
γ
2
(τt − Et−1τt), (46)
ρ(c∗t − Et−1c
∗
t ) =
λψ∗
1 + ψ∗ − λ
u∗t − (ι
∗
t − Et−1ι
∗
t ) +
γ
2
(τt − Et−1τt). (47)
Home consumption innovations depend on domestic productivity shocks and the revision to
current fundamentals, i.e. unanticipated movements in interest rates and the terms of trade.
From the above expressions we find that interest rate responses to productivity shocks
are
ιt − Et−1ιt =
χ(utΨ− u
∗
tΨ
∗)
1 + χ+ χ∗
, (48)
ι∗t − Et−1ι
∗
t =
χ∗(u∗tΨ
∗ − utΨ)
1 + χ+ χ∗
. (49)
5 Welfare and optimal monetary policy rules
Central banks can commit to interest rate rules. In this section we analyze optimal monetary
policy from a welfare perspective, namely we find the parameters of the interest rate rule
that maximize expected utility.
Expected utility is
Et−1Ut = Et−1
C1−ρt
1− ρ
− kEt−1Lt. (50)
In the following sections we illustrate the optimal cooperative and non-cooperative policies
under LCP and PCP.
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Appendix E shows that expected employment in the Home country as of date t− 1 is
Et−1Lt =
1− γ/2
MpMwk
Et−1
(
C1−ρt
)
+
γ/2
MpMwk
Et−1
(
C∗1−ρt
)
. (51)
where Mp ≡ θ/(θ − 1) and Mw ≡ δPR/(δPR − 1).
Substituting expected employment in the expected utility, the latter becomes a function
of Ct, C
∗
t and the parameters of the model
Et−1Ut =
(
MpMw − (1− γ/2)(1− ρ)
(1− ρ)MpMw
)
Et−1C
1−ρ
t −
γ/2
MpMw
Et−1
(
C∗1−ρt
)
. (52)
5.1 LCP: Optimal Policies
Coordination
Under coordination, the monetary authorities solve the following problem
max
χ,χ∗,ψ,ψ∗
1/2 (Et−1Ut + Et−1U
∗
t ) . (53)
The choice of ψ does not affect the wage mark-up in eq. (38). The central bank chooses
ψ so as to reduce the distortion stemming from preset pricing. The larger ψ, the closer is
the response of total consumption to technological shocks to the flexible-price equilibrium
(see eq. (34)). Hence, for a given value of χ, the expected utility is always increasing in ψ.
The optimal value of χ when ψ →∞ is obtained (in a symmetric equilibrium) by solving
the following expression
−M′w[χ] =
Mw(1− γ)2λ(MwMp + ρ− 1)σ2u(1− λ+ 2χ)
(MwMp − 1)ρ(1 + 2χ)3
, (54)
where M′w[χ] ≡ dMw/dχ. As noted earlier, the union’s mark-up is endogenous to the
exchange-rate targeting policy. In particular, a higher weight on the exchange rate target
reduces the monopolistic distortion in the labor market, i.e. M′w[χ] < 0.
Intuitively, the central bank faces a trade-off between dynamic and static distortions.
The former is due to the fact that prices are rigid in the short run while the latter is the
labor market distortion. The monetary authority aims to equalize the marginal benefits
from a reduction in the labor market distortion (L.H.S. of eq. (54)) to the marginal cost of
a less efficient response of consumption to productivity shocks (R.H.S. of eq. (54)). When
the labor market distortions at Home and Foreign are large – and larger than the dynamic
distortion, it is optimal to put a large weight on the exchange rate target, i.e χ, χ∗ large but
less than infinity. Conversely, when dynamic distortions are relatively more important, it is
optimal not to target the exchange rate, i.e. χ, χ∗ = 0.
To analyze these trade-offs, we calibrate our simple model using the parameters in Table
1.11 The elasticity of substitution among the same type of goods, θ, the elasticity of sub-
stitution among labor types, σ, the inverse of the rate of intertemporal substitution, ρ, and
11The value of ψ is set equal to 125 in all the calibration exercises.
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Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value
θ Elasticity of Substitution (Goods) 8
σ Elasticity of Substitution (Labor Types) 4
λ Autocorrelation 0.82
σu Standard Deviation Innovation 0.0229
ρ Inverse of Intertemporal Rate of Substitution 5
γ Share of Traded Goods in Total Consuption 0.4
n Number of unions 3
5 10 15 20 25 30
Χ
-0.578
-0.576
-0.574
-0.572
-0.570
-0.568
-0.566
Expected Utility
Cooperation
Figure 1: Benchmark calibration: LCP
the share of traded goods in total consumption, γ, are from Benigno and Thoenissen (2003).
The standard deviation of productivity innovations is taken from Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe
(2004). Foreign and Home are symmetric.
Figure 1 shows that, under the benchmark calibration, the cooperative equilibrium re-
quires large weights on the exchange rate target, namely χ = χ∗ have large positive values.
Intuitively, the labor market distortion is large in this calibration and the central banks
are better off to commit to strong interest rate responses to exchange rate innovations in
order to reduce wage mark-ups. A lower distortion in the labor market and/or a higher
volatility of the productivity shocks reduce the importance of the labor market distortion
relative to the dynamic one. Figure 2 depicts the case where the standard deviation of the
productivity shocks is more than 60 times larger than under the benchmark parametriza-
tion, σu = 1.4. In this case, it is optimal not to target the exchange rate under cooperation,
namely χ = χ∗ = 0. Intuitively, idiosyncratic productivity shocks are extremely volatile and
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Figure 2: σu = 1.4: LCP
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Figure 3: Welfare decomposition
the need for full exchange rate flexibility is restored.
Under the benchmark calibration, it is optimal to target the exchange rate with a large
weight. To understand this result, we evaluate welfare under two extreme assumptions.
First, we assume that the wage mark-up is constant and monetary policy cannot affect it.
This is Figure 3(a), showing that if we consider only the distortion stemming from preset
pricing, optimal monetary policy would not target at all the exchange rate. Second, we
assume that the variance of the technological shock is zero, namely σ2u = σ
2
u∗ = 0. In this
case, optimal monetary policy targets the exchange rate targeting with large weights. This
is shown in Figure 3(a) respectively. Notice that the cooperative equilibrium is characterized
by either no exchange rate targeting at all or by a very large weight on the exchange rate in
the interest rate rule. This feature is going to disappear in the Nash equilibrium.
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Nash
Under Nash the Home monetary authority chooses χ, ψ to solve
max
χ,ψ
Et−1Ut. (55)
taking χ∗, ψ∗ as given. Expected utility is increasing in ψ and the optimal weight on the
CPI target is large, specifically ψ → ∞. As noted in the cooperative case, choosing a large
ψ reduces the dynamic distortion without any impact on the static one.
In a symmetric equilibrium, the optimal value of χ solves the following expression:
M′w[χ] =
Mw(1− γ)2σ2u(2MwMp(1 + χ) + (ρ− 1)(2− γ + 2(1− γ)χ))(1 + 2χ− λ)λ
(2−MwMp(2− γ) + (2− γ)γ(ρ− 1))ρ(1 + 2χ)3
.
Three factors determine the optimal weight on the exchange rate target, χ. A higher value
of χ reduces the labor market distortion; a lower value of χ makes price and consumption
responses closer to the flexible price equilibrium. These two effects are the same we have seen
under cooperation and they push χ to opposite extremes. Under Nash there is a third factor:
the central bank wants to strategically increase the labor mark-up so as to increase domestic
vis-a`-vis foreign PPI. This is the terms-of-trade effect as in Corsetti and Pesenti (2001),
where the gains from appreciating the terms of trade offset the efficiency loss stemming from
lower output.
To assess the strategic incentive to raise the terms of trade, we eliminate the dynamic
distortion and set σ2u = 0, which is a good approximation of our benchmark model. The
first-order condition relative to χ implies:
Mw =
2 + (2− γ)γ(ρ− 1)
Mp(2− γ)
, Mw ≥ 1.
Intuitively, an interior solution to the optimal value of χ satisfies the equation and the
constraint above. In particular, the solution is increasing in γ and, for ρ > 1, in ρ as well.
An increase in γ raises the fraction of traded goods in the consumption basket and makes the
economy more open to Foreign goods. As the economy becomes more open, the terms-of-
trade effect becomes stronger and optimal monetary policy achieves a higher wage mark-up
in order to raise domestic PPI relative to the foreign one. Similarly, when ρ > 1 Home
and Foreign goods are substitutes. An increase in ρ makes Home and Foreign goods more
substitutable, thereby making the terms-of-trade effect stronger.
Figure 4 depicts expected utility for the Home country as a function of χ for the bench-
mark specification. In the Nash equilibrium, the optimal weight on the exchange rate target
is zero, χ = χ∗ = 0, and the exchange rate is freely floating. In our benchmark specification,
the degree of openness is high. As a result, the terms-of-trade effect prevails over the labor
market distortion. While it is optimal to target the exchange rate under cooperation, it is
not so under Nash.
As γ falls and the economy becomes less open, the terms-of-trade effect weakens. Figure
5 shows the case where the economy is more closed relative to benchmark (γ = 0.1). Now
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Figure 5: γ = 0.1: LCP
the optimal weight on the exchange rate target is positive and finite, χ = χ∗ = 4.20, which
implies an exchange rate regime of managed floating.
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5.2 PCP: Optimal Policies
Coordination
This optimization problem is conceptually similar to the one under LCP. Appendix E.3 spells
out the mathematical details. Once again, it is optimal to target the PPI with a large weight
in order to bring the allocation closer to its flexible price counterpart, namely ψ, ψ∗ → ∞.
The first-order condition relative to χ when ψ, ψ∗ →∞ is
−M′w[χ] =
Mw(1 + (2− γ)γ(ρ− 1))(MwMp − 1 + ρ)σ
2
u(1 + 2χ− λ)λ
(MwMp − 1)ρ(1 + 2χ)3
.
The trade-off in the choice of χ, χ∗ is similar to the LCP case and we refer the reader to our
earlier discussion. In the remainder of this section we focus on how this trade off is affected
by the two price specifications.
For realistic parameter values, the labor-market distortion is smaller under PCP than
LCP. Since prices are preset, the CPI is completely predetermined under LCP. Unions there-
fore set not only the nominal but also the real wage under LCP. Under PCP, on the other
hand, only the PPI is predetermined while the CPI varies with the exchange rate. Unions
anticipate that an increase in wages is going to depreciate the exchange rate and thereby
raise the CPI. When the country is sufficiently open (γ large enough) and Home and Foreign
goods are substitutes (ρ > 1), the anticipation of a CPI increase will restrain wage demands.
As a result, the wage mark-up is lower under PCP than LCP.
Under the benchmark calibration, optimal monetary policy under PCP and coordination
does not target the exchange rate, χ = χ∗ = 0, and the exchange rate is flexible. Because the
labor market distortion is lower under PCP than LCP, the optimal χ, χ∗ are lower under PCP.
This implies that the case for not targeting the exchange rate arises for smaller variances
of the technological shocks under PCP than LCP. For our benchmark calibration, values of
σ2u = σ
2
u∗ > 0.06 are sufficient for χ = χ
∗ = 0 to be optimal under PCP, while in the LCP
specification this threshold has to be larger, i.e. σ2u = σ
2
u∗ > 1.96. Figure 6 displays expected
utility as function of χ under the benchmark calibration of Table 1 but σ2u = σ
2
u∗ = 0.09.
Nash
Under PCP, as well as LCP, it is optimal to choose a large value of ψ in the Nash equilibrium
in order to reduce the welfare losses stemming from preset pricing (see Appendix E.3). The
optimal choice of χ depends on the balance between the terms-of-trade effect, the dynamic,
and the static distortion. For χ→∞, the optimal value of χ solves
−M′w[χ] =
Mw(ρ− 1)σ2u(−2(1 + χ) + (γ − 2)γ(ρ− 2(1 + χ)))(1 + 2χ− λ)λ
(2 +MwMp(γ − 2) + (2− γ)γ(ρ− 1))ρ(1 + 2χ)3
+
+
MpM2wσ
2
u((γ − 2)(1 + γ(ρ− 1))− 2(1− γ)χ)(1 + 2χ− λ)λ
(2 +MwMp(γ − 2) + (2− γ)γ(ρ− 1))ρ(1 + 2χ)3
.
Under the benchmark calibration, it is optimal not to target the exchange rate and set χ = 0.
As for the case with LCP, the incentive to improve the terms of trade depends on the degree
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Figure 6: Expected utility with σ2u = 0.09
of openness γ and the risk aversion coefficient ρ. In particular, as γ increases, Home becomes
more open and therefore more affected by terms-of-trade changes. Similarly, a higher value of
ρ makes Home and Foreign goods more substitutable and raises the incentive to strategically
improve the terms of trade.
Figure 7 shows expected utility in the Nash equilibrium under PCP and LCP for γ = 0.1
– a lower degree of openness than for the benchmark calibration. Under both specifications,
χ is positive and finite and the resulting exchange rate regime is a managed float. The
optimal weight on the exchange rate target is lower under PCP than LCP, as argued earlier.
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Χ
-0.574
-0.572
-0.570
-0.568
Expected Utility
Nash
PCP
LCP
Figure 7: Expected utility with γ = 0.1
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Notice that the results concerning the optimal degree of exchange-rate targeting under
LCP and PCP are robust to the presence of permanent productivity shocks, λ = 1, as
assumed by Duarte and Obstfeld (2008) and Devereux and Engel (2003).12 We have repeated
our calibration exercises with a standard deviation corresponding to permanent productivity
innovations (e.g. Gal´ı (2003)) and found qualitatively similar results. Moreover, when λ = 1
the weight on the PPI/CPI in the interest rate rule, ψ, drops out of expected utility and
therefore becomes irrelevant for welfare – as long as it is strictly positive in order for prices
to be determined.
6 Conclusions
This paper asks whether an optimal interest rate rule should explicitly target the exchange
rate in an environment with non-traded goods, different degrees of pass-through and non-
atomistic unions. The main finding is that exchange-rate targeting can be optimal when
the labor market distortion is large. The reason is that non-atomistic labor unions take into
account the interest rate response to the depreciation brought by their wage claims. Hence,
monetary policy can reduce labor market distortions by committing to target the exchange
rate.
The case for exchange-rate targeting is stronger under cooperation than Nash. In the
absence of cooperation, each monetary authority tries to strategically improve the terms-of-
trade. This is achieved by targeting less (or not targeting at all) the exchange rate so as
to raise the wage mark up. The case of exchange-rate targeting is also stronger under LCP
than PCP because the labor market distortion is itself smaller under PCP.
A number of extensions would be desirable. We have not analyzed the case of a fixed
exchange rate regime because it requires an asymmetric setup. However, our model can be
easily changed to allow for a fixed exchange rate and the methodology presented here can be
easily applied. We have focused on preset pricing because they allow us to solve most of the
model analytically. More realistic price setting mechanisms could be assumed and studied.
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Appendix
A Impact of union’s wage on aggregate wage
From the wage index (17), we obtain
∂Wt
∂Wt(x)
=
∂
∂Wt(x)
[∫ 1
0
Wt(z)
1−σdz
] 1
1−σ
=
∂
∂Wt(x)
[∫
z∈x
Wt(z)
1−σdz +
∫
z /∈x
Wt(z)
1−σdz
] 1
1−σ
=
1
n
[
Wt(x)
Wt
]−σ
=
1
n
(A.1)
where the last equality holds in a symmetric equilibrium, i.e. when W (x) =W .
B Labor type demand elasticity to union’s wage
B.1 Flexible prices
Substituting eq. (29) into the definition of CPI, we may rewrite eq. (6) and the corresponding
one in the Foreign country as follows:
Pt =
θ
θ − 1
Wt
(A∗t )
γ
2A
1− γ
2
t
(B.1)
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P ∗t =
θ
θ − 1
W ∗t
A
γ
2
t (A
∗
t )
1− γ
2
(B.2)
Using eq. (A.1), the elasticity of CPI to wage x is directly obtained from eq. (B.1) in a
symmetric equilibrium as follows:
ZFLp ≡
∂ logPt
∂ logWt(x)
=
1
n
. (B.3)
The aggregate labor demand can be written as function of domestic consumption as
follows:
Lt =
CHt + CNt + C
∗
Ht
At
=
Ct
2
(AtA
∗
t )
−γ/2
(
A−1+γt (2− γ) + (A
∗
t )
(1−γ)(1−ρ)
ρ A
− 1−γ
ρ
t γ
)
, (B.4)
where we have used eqs. (8), (9), (10), (B.1), (B.2), and (12). Then, from the Euler equation
(11) and the Home interest rate rule (1) or (3), it follows that
ZFLC ≡=
∂ logCt
∂ logWt(x)
= −
1 + ψ + χ
ρ
ZFLp = −Z
FL
L
1
n
, (B.5)
where ZFLL corresponds to the elasticity of aggregate labor demand to the aggregate union’s
wage ZFLL ≡
1+ψ+χ
ρ
above. Finally, the elasticity of labor type x to the union’s real wage x
is given by
δFL ≡ −
∂ logLt(z)
∂ log(Wt(x)/Pt)
= ZFLl
∂ logWt(x)
∂ log(Wt(x)/Pt)
=
σ
1− ZFLp
(
1−
1
n
)
+
ZFLL
1− ZFLp
1
n
= σ +
1 + ψ + χ(
1− 1
n
)
ρ
1
n
> 1. (B.6)
B.2 Predetermined prices
Using the optimal prices expressions (20), (25), (23), (22) and the definition of CPI (6), we
may rewrite the Home CPI as follows:
Pt =
θ
θ − 1
E
γ
2
η
t

Et−1
(
C1−ρt
Wt
At
)
Et−1
(
C1−ρt
)


1− γ
2

Et−1
(
C1−ρt E
1−η
t
W ∗t
A∗t
)
Et−1
(
C1−ρt
)


γ
2
, (B.7)
where η ∈ {0, 1} is the degree of exchange rate pass-through, i.e. η = 0 with LCP and η = 1
with PCP.
Wages are set under discretion. Therefore, trade unions cannot affect expectation at time
t. From eq. (B.7), the only channel through which wage claims have an impact on prices is
the exchange rate.
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Now, in order to assess how trade unions internalize the impact of their wage settlement
on the exchange rate, it is convenient to log-linearize some equations around a steady state
with A0 = A
∗
0 = 1. Henceforth, we will denote a log-linearized variable V around its steady
state V0 as follows: v ≡ (V − V0)/V0; and its cross-country difference as vR ≡ v− v∗. Under
the assumption that the initial net asset position of Home and Foreign is equal to zero, at
the steady state
C0 = C
∗
0 = L0 = L
∗
0, P0 =
θ
θ − 1
W0, P
∗
0 =
θ
θ − 1
W ∗0 . (B.8)
From the Back and Smith condition (12) we have that E0 = W0/W ∗0 and
et = p
R
t + ρc
R
t . (B.9)
Since unions take expectations on marginal costs as given, the log-linearized difference be-
tween the Home CPI (B.7) and the corresponding for the Foreign country turns out to be
(disregarding constant additive terms)
pRt = γηet. (B.10)
Similarly, from the aggregate demands ((8), (9), and (10)) and the household’s budget con-
straint (7), we have
yRt = (1− γ)(p
R
t + c
R
t ) + γηet, (B.11)
divRt
θ
= (1− γ) (pRt + c
R
t ) + γet −
θ − 1
θ
(wRt + y
R
t − a
R
t ). (B.12)
Thus, combining eqs. (B.9)-(B.11), the elasticity of exchange rate to aggregate Home wage
is given by
∂et
∂wt
=
(θ − 1)ρ
1− γ(1− θρ+ η(1− γ + (γ + θ − 2)ρ))
≡ ZPRE > 0, (B.13)
where we have assumed that unions take the impact of their wage on dividends as given, i.e.
∂divRt /∂w = 0.
13
Now, making use of eq. (B.13), it is straightforward to calculate the elasticity of CPI
(B.7) to wage x as follows:
ZPRp ≡
∂ logPt
∂ logWt(x)
=
γη
2n
ZPRE . (B.14)
Under LCP (i.e. when η = 0) the above elasticity is zero and, for reasonable calibration of
parameters, eq. (B.14) is greater than zero and less than one under the PCP specification
(i.e. when η = 1).
Notice that the aggregate labor demand is given by
Lt =
CHt + CNt + C
∗
Ht
At
=
Ct
At
[(
1−
γ
2
) Pt
PHt
+
γ
2
(
EtP ∗t
Pt
)1− 1
ρ Pt
EtP ∗Ht
]
=
Ct
At
relt, (B.15)
13This is consistent with the literature. See e.g. Lippi (2003) and Gnocchi (2006).
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where we have used eqs. (8), (9), (10), and (12). It turns out that the above expression
depends on two components: consumption and relative prices rel.
First, from the Euler equation (11) and the Home interest rate rule (3) or (1), it follows
that
∂ logCt
∂ logWt(x)
= −
[ γη
2
+ χ
ρ
]
ZPRE
n
. (B.16)
Next, we rewrite t in eq. (B.15) as follows:
relt =
(
1−
γ
2
)
(pt − pHt) +
γ
2
[(
1−
1
ρ
)
p∗t +
1
ρ
(pt − et)− p
∗
Ht
]
, (B.17)
which yields
∂relt
∂wt
= −[1 + γη(ρ− 1)− 2ηρ]
γZPRE
2ρ
. (B.18)
The elasticity of aggregate labor demand to aggregate wage is hence given by
ZPRL ≡ −
∂ logLt
∂ logWt
=
ZPRE (2χ+ γ(1 + η(1 + γ(ρ− 1)− 2ρ)))
2ρ
. (B.19)
Finally, the elasticity of labor type x to the union’s real wage x is given by
δPR ≡ −
∂ logLt(z)
∂ log(Wt(x)/Pt)
= ZPRl
∂ logWt(x)
∂ log(Wt(x)/Pt)
=
σ
1− ZPRp
(
1−
1
n
)
+
ZPRL
1− ZPRp
1
n
=
(
1− 1
n
)
σ
1−
γZPR
E
η
2n
+
ZPRE (2χ+ γ(1 + η(1 + γ(ρ− 1)− 2ρ)))
2n
(
1−
γZPR
E
η
2n
)
ρ
. (B.20)
C First order condition union x
In order to derive the x-th union first-order condition, it is convenient to reproduce the
Lagrangian relevant to this purpose
LW =
Ct(x)
1−ρ
1− ρ
− kLt(x) + λt
[
Ct(x) +
∑
st+1
Qst+1|stBst+1(x)/Pt
+Mt(x)/Pt − Bst(x)/Pt −Mt−1(x)/Pt − Tt(x)−Wt(x)Lt(x)/Pt
−1/Pt
∫ 1
0
[ΠH,t(i, x) + ΠN,t(i, x)]di
]
, (C.1)
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where the labor demand (16) has been plugged in. The first-order condition with respect to
Wt(x) is given by
−k
∂Lt(x)
∂Wt(x)
= λt
[
Lt(x) +
∂Lt(x)
∂Wt(x)
Wt(x)
Pt
−
∂Pt
∂Wt(x)
Wt(x)Lt(x)
P 2t
]
−k
∂Lt(x)
∂Wt(x)
= −
C−ρt (x)Lt(x)
Pt
[
1 +
∂Lt(x)
∂Wt(x)
Wt(x)
Lt(x)
−
∂Pt
∂Wt(x)
Wt(x)
Pt
]
kZrl = −
C−ρt (x)Wt(x)
Pt
[
1− Zrl − Z
r
p
]
kδr =
C−ρt Wt
Pt
[δr − 1] , r ∈ [PR, FL],
where in the last equation we have dropped the x index because of the symmetry between
workers in equilibrium and used the definition of δr derived in Appendix B.
D Equilibrium with preset prices
Expected consumption.
Using (B.7), (12), and (38), taking expectations dated period t− 1 yields
1 =
θk
θ − 1
(
δPR
δPR − 1
)1− γ
2
(
δ∗PR
δ∗PR − 1
)γ
2
[
Et−1
CtE
γη
2
t
At
]1− γ
2
[
Et−1
CtE
γη
2 −η
t
A∗t
] γ
2
Et−1C
1−ρ
t
. (D.1)
From the log-normality assumption, ct = logCt ∼ N (E(ct), σ2c ) and et = log Et ∼
N (E(et), σ2e), we can write eq. (D.1) as
exp
{
(1− ρ)Et−1ct +
(1− ρ)2
2
σ2c
}
=
θk
θ − 1
(
δPR
δPR − 1
)1− γ
2
(
δ∗PR
δ∗PR − 1
) γ
2
×
×
{
exp
[
Et−1ct − Et−1at +
γ
2
ηEt−1et +
σ2c + σ
2
u + γ
2η2/2σ2e
2
+
γησec − 2σcu − γησeu
2
]}1− γ
2
×
×
{
exp
[
Et−1ct − Et−1a
∗
t − η
(
1−
γ
2
)
Et−1et +
σ2c + σ
2
u∗ + (1− γ/2)
2 η2σ2e
2
+
− η
(
1−
γ
2
)
σec − σcu∗ + η
(
1−
γ
2
)
σeu∗
]} γ
2
. (D.2)
Taking logs and simplifying, we may solve for the expected Home consumption (expected
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Foreign consumption is obtained in an analogous way)
Et−1ct = −
1
ρ
log
[
θk
θ − 1
(
δPR
δPR − 1
)1− γ
2
(
δ∗PR
δ∗PR − 1
)γ
2
]
+
(ρ− 2)
2
σ2c
−
1
ρ
[
η2
γ
2
(
1−
γ
2
)] σ2e
2
+
1
ρ
[(
1−
γ
2
)
σcu +
γ
2
σcu∗
]
+
1
ρ
γ
2
η
(
1−
γ
2
)
(σeu − σeu∗)
+
1
ρ
[(
1−
γ
2
)
Et−1at +
γ
2
Et−1a
∗
t
]
−
1
ρ
[(
1−
γ
2
) σ2u
2
+
γ
2
σ2u∗
2
]
, (D.3)
Et−1c
∗
t = −
1
ρ
log
[
θk
θ − 1
(
δ∗PR
δ∗PR − 1
)1− γ
2
(
δPR
δPR − 1
)γ
2
]
+
(ρ− 2)
2
σ2c∗
−
1
ρ
[
η2
γ
2
(
1−
γ
2
)] σ2e
2
+
1
ρ
[(
1−
γ
2
)
σc∗u∗ +
γ
2
σc∗u
]
+
1
ρ
γ
2
η
(
1−
γ
2
)
(σeu − σeu∗)
+
1
ρ
[(
1−
γ
2
)
Et−1a
∗
t +
γ
2
Et−1at
]
−
1
ρ
[(
1−
γ
2
) σ2u∗
2
+
γ
2
σ2u
2
]
. (D.4)
Solution in the PCP specification (η = 1). We introduce some new notation. For
any variable vt+j ≥ 0, define
Eˆtvt+j = Etvt+j − Et−1vt+j .
Moreover, when j = 0, we will write simply vˆt = vt − Et−1vt
The interest rate rules in the PCP case are given by:
ιt = ι¯+ ψpHt + χeˆt
ι∗t = ι¯
∗ + ψ∗p∗Ft − χ
∗eˆt,
so that
ιˆt = χeˆt (D.5)
ιˆ∗t = −χ
∗eˆt (D.6)
Moreover, with PCP pricing, the law of one price holds for traded goods. Hence, from
the risk-sharing condition:
ρ(cˆt − cˆ
∗
t ) = (1− γ)τˆt = (1− γ)eˆt, (D.7)
where τt ≡ et + p∗Ft − pHt = pFt − pHt indicates the terms of trades. It turns out that
pt = pHt +
γ
2
τt ; p
∗
t = p
∗
Ft −
γ
2
τt.
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Using (D.3), (D.4), (D.7), taking expectations dated period t− 1 of the Euler equation, we
obtain (disregarding additive constants)
pHt =
λ(λ− 1)
1 + ψ − λ
at−1,
p∗Ft =
λ(λ− 1)
1 + ψ∗ − λ
a∗t−1.
Using the above expressions and Eˆtτt+1 = λ(ut − u
∗
t ) into the Euler equation we have that
ιˆt =
λψ
1 + ψ − λ
ut − ρcˆt −
γ
2
τˆt (D.8)
ιˆ∗t =
λψ∗
1 + ψ∗ − λ
u∗t − ρcˆ
∗
t +
γ
2
τˆt, (D.9)
which correspond to eqs. (46) and (47) in the text.
Eqs. (D.5)-(D.9) yield
σ2c =
(
(2− γ + 2χ∗)Ψ
2ρ(1 + χ+ χ∗)
)2
σ2u +
(
(γ + 2χ)Ψ∗
2ρ(1 + χ+ χ∗)
)2
σ2u∗ ; (D.10)
σcu =
(2− γ + 2χ∗)Ψ
2ρ(1 + χ+ χ∗)
σ2u ; σcu∗ =
(γ + 2χ)Ψ∗
2ρ(1 + χ+ χ∗)
σ2u∗ ; (D.11)
σ2c∗ =
(
(γ + 2χ∗)Ψ
2ρ(1 + χ + χ∗)
)2
σ2u +
(
(2− γ + 2χ)Ψ∗
2ρ(1 + χ + χ∗)
)2
σ2u∗ ; (D.12)
σc∗u =
(γ + 2χ∗)Ψ
2ρ(1 + χ+ χ∗)
σ2u ; σc∗u∗ =
(2− γ + 2χ)Ψ∗
2ρ(1 + χ+ χ∗)
σ2u∗ ; (D.13)
σ2e =
(
Ψ
1 + χ+ χ∗
)2
σ2u +
(
−
Ψ∗
1 + χ + χ∗
)2
σ2u∗ ; (D.14)
σeu =
Ψ
1 + χ+ χ∗
σ2u ; σeu∗ = −
Ψ∗
1 + χ+ χ∗
σ2u∗ , (D.15)
where Ψ ≡ λψ
1+ψ−λ
and Ψ∗ ≡ λψ
∗
1+ψ∗−λ
.
Solution in the LCP specification (η = 0). For any variable vt+j ≥ 0, define
Eˆtvt+j = Etvt+j − Et−1vt+j .
Moreover, when j = 0, we will write simply vˆt = vt − Et−1vt.
The interest rate rules in the LCP case are given by:
ιt = ι¯+ ψpt + χeˆt
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ι∗t = ι¯
∗ + ψ∗p∗t − χ
∗eˆt,
so that
ιˆt = χeˆt (D.16)
ιˆ∗t = −χ
∗eˆt. (D.17)
From the risk-sharing condition we obtain
eˆt = ρ(cˆt − cˆ
∗
t ). (D.18)
The Euler equation in the Home country yields
ιt = Et (ρct+1 + pt+1)− pt − ρct + Γi (D.19)
where Γi is a constant. Using (D.3), taking expectations dated period t− 1, and solving for
pt we have that
pt =
λ(λ− 1)
1 + ψ − λ
[(
1−
γ
2
)
at−1 +
γ
2
a∗t−1
]
+ Γi/ψ. (D.20)
From the difference between (D.19) and its expected value at t−1, and using eqs. (D.3) and
(D.20), we can write the following expressions for innovations to consumption:
cˆt = Ψ/ρ[(1− γ/2)ut + γ/2u
∗
t ]− ιˆt/ρ (D.21)
cˆ∗t = Ψ
∗/ρ[(1− γ/2)u∗t + γ/2ut]− ιˆ
∗
t/ρ, (D.22)
where Ψ = λψ
1+ψ−λ
and Ψ∗ = λψ
∗
1+ψ∗−λ
.
Thus, combining eqs. (D.16)-(D.22) we obtain
σ2c =
(
((2− γ)(1 + χ∗)Ψ + γχΨ∗)
2ρ(1 + χ+ χ∗)
)2
σ2u +
(
(γ(1 + χ∗)Ψ + (2− γ)χΨ∗)
2ρ(1 + χ+ χ∗)
)2
σ2u∗ (D.23)
σcu =
((2− γ)(1 + χ∗)Ψ + γχΨ∗)
2ρ(1 + χ + χ∗)
σ2u; (D.24)
σcu∗ =
(γ(1 + χ∗)Ψ + (2− γ)χΨ∗)
2ρ(1 + χ + χ∗)
σ2u∗ ; (D.25)
σ2c∗ =
(
((2− γ)χ∗Ψ+ γ(1 + χ)Ψ∗)
2ρ(1 + χ + χ∗)
)2
σ2u +
(
(γχ∗Ψ+ (2− γ)(1 + χ)Ψ∗)
2ρ(1 + χ+ χ∗)
)2
σ2u∗ (D.26)
σc∗u =
(
((2− γ)χ∗Ψ+ γ(1 + χ)Ψ∗)
2ρ(1 + χ+ χ∗)
)
σ2u; (D.27)
σc∗u∗ =
(
(γχ∗Ψ+ (2− γ)(1 + χ)Ψ∗)
2ρ(1 + χ+ χ∗)
)
σ2u∗ . (D.28)
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E Optimal monetary policies
E.1 Expected Employment.
The goods-market equilibrium condition are
AtLTt = CHt + C
∗
Ht =
γ
2
Pt
PHt
Ct +
γ
2
P ∗t
P ∗Ht
C∗t
AtLNt = CNt = (1− γ)
Pt
PNt
Ct.
Using the above equations with the optimal pricing equations (20) and (22) and the
risk-sharing condition (12) yields
Lt =
1− γ
2
MpMwk
Et−1
(
C1−ρt
)
Et−1
(
C1−ρt Wt/At
)C1−ρt Wt
At
+
γ
2
MpMwk
Et−1
(
C∗1−ρt
)
Et−1
(
C∗1−ρt W
∗
t /At
)C∗1−ρt W ∗t
At
,
where Mp ≡ θ/(θ − 1) and Mw ≡ δPR/(δPR − 1). Therefore expected employment in the
Home country at date t− 1 is
Et−1Lt =
1− γ/2
MpMwk
Et−1
(
C1−ρt
)
+
γ/2
MpMwk
Et−1
(
C∗1−ρt
)
. (E.1)
E.2 Optimal policies in the LCP specification.
Coordination:
In a Cooperative solution, the monetary authorities coordinate on rules so as to solve the
following problem
max
χ,χ∗,ψ,ψ∗
1/2 (Et−1Ut + Et−1U
∗
t ) .
The first-order condition in a symmetric equilibrium for χ = χ∗ is given by
−M′w[χ] =
Mw(1− γ)2(MwMp + ρ− 1)σ2u(1 + 2χ−Ψ)Ψ
(MwMp − 1)ρ(1 + 2χ)3
, (E.2)
where M′w[χ] ≡ dMw/dχ. The optimal values of χ is obtained by eq. (E.2).
The (symmetrical) optimal value of ψ = ψ∗ is instead obtained by the following first-order
condition
Ψ ≡
λψ
1 + ψ − λ
= 1 +
2(1− γ)2χ
2− (2− γ)γ + 4χ(1 + χ)
≥ 1,
which implies setting ψ →∞.
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Nash solution:
max
χ,ψ
Et−1Ut = D expS −D
∗ expS∗,
where
S =
(
1
2
(1− ρ)2 +
1
2
(1− ρ)(−2 + ρ)
)
σ2c +
(1− ρ)
((
1− γ
2
)
σcu +
γσcu∗
2
)
ρ
,
S∗ =
(
1
2
(1− ρ)2 +
1
2
(1− ρ)(−2 + ρ)
)
σ2c∗ +
(1− ρ)
(
γσc∗u
2
+
(
1− γ
2
)
σc∗u∗
)
ρ
,
D =M
ρ−1
ρ
p Mw(χ)
(1− γ2 )(−1+ρ)
ρ M
γ(−1+ρ)
2ρ
w∗
(
−
1− γ
2
MpMw(χ)
+
1
1− ρ
)
,
D∗ =
Mw(χ)
γ(ρ−1)−1
2ρ M
(1− γ2 )(−1+ρ)
ρ
w∗ γ
2Mp
M
ρ−1
ρ
p .
The first-order condition for χ evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium σ2u = σ
2
u∗ and
χ∗ = χ is given by:14
∂(D −D∗)
∂Mw(χ)
M′w(χ)−D
∗∂S
∗
∂χ
+D
∂S
∂χ
= 0.
M′w[χ] =
Mw(1− γ)2σ2u(2MwMp(1 + χ) + (ρ− 1)(2− γ + 2(1− γ)χ))(1 + 2χ−Ψ)Ψ
(2 +MwMp(γ − 2) + (2− γ)γ(ρ− 1))ρ(1 + 2χ)3
.
(E.3)
Again, the optimal value of χ has to satisfy eq. (E.3).
The optimal value of ψ instead solves the following first-order condition:
Ψ =
(1 + 2χ)(2MwMp(2 + (γ − 2)γ)(1 + χ))
2MwMp(1 + χ) (2− 2γ + γ2 + 2χ) + (ρ− 1)G
+
+
(1 + 2χ)((2− γ)(ρ− 1)(2(1 + χ) + γ(−2 + γ + 2(γ − 1)χ)))
2MwMp(1 + χ) (2− 2γ + γ2 + 2χ) + (ρ− 1)G
,
where G ≡ 4− γ(6− (4− γ)γ) + 8χ− 2γ(4− (3− γ)γ)χ + 4χ2 > 0. The above expression
reduces to Ψ = 1 when γ = 1. Since the R.H.S. of the above expression is decreasing in γ,
it turns out that the optimal value of ψ will be an extreme one, i.e. ψ →∞.
14In a symmetric equilibrium, it turns out that S = S∗.
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E.3 Optimal policies in the PCP specification.
Coordination:
In a Cooperative solution, the monetary authorities coordinate on rules so as to solve the
following problem
max
χ,χ∗,ψ,ψ∗
1/2 (Et−1Ut + Et−1U
∗
t ) .
The first order condition with respect to χ in a symmetric equilibrium is given by
−M′w[χ] =
Mw(1 + (2− γ)γ(ρ− 1))(MwMp − 1 + ρ)σ2u(1 + 2χ−Ψ)Ψ
(MwMp − 1)ρ(1 + 2χ)3
, (E.4)
while the first-order with respect to ψ is given by
Ψ = 1 +
2(1 + (2− γ)γ(ρ− 1))χ
(2− γ)γ(ρ− 1) + 2(1 + 2χ(1 + χ))
> 1,
which is solved by ψ →∞.
Nash solution:
Home monetary authority solves the following problem
max
χ,ψ
Et−1Ut = D expS −D
∗ expS∗
taking χ∗ and ψ∗ as given, where
S =
(ρ− 1)(4ρσ2c − 8σcu + γ((2− γ)σ
2
e + 4σcu − 4σcu∗ − 2(2− γ)(σeu − σeu∗)))
8ρ
,
S∗ =
(ρ− 1)(4ρσ2c∗ − 8σc∗u∗ + γ((2− γ)σ
2
e − 4σc∗u + 4σc∗u∗ − 2(2− γ)(σeu − σeu∗)))
8ρ
,
D =Mw(χ)
(1− γ2 )(ρ−1)
ρ M
γ(ρ−1)
2ρ
w∗ M
ρ−1
ρ
p
(
1
1− ρ
−
1− γ
2
MpMw(χ)
)
,
D∗ =
Mw(χ)
γ(ρ−1)−1
2ρ M
(1− γ2 )(ρ−1)
ρ
w∗ γ
2Mp
M
ρ−1
ρ
p .
The first-order condition for χ evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium σ2u = σ
2
u∗ and
χ∗ = χ is as follows:
∂(D −D∗)
∂Mw(χ)
M′w(χ)−D
∗∂S
∗
∂χ
+D
∂S
∂χ
= 0.
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−M′w[χ] =
Mw(ρ− 1)σ2u(−2(1 + χ) + (−2 + γ)γ(ρ− 2(1 + χ)))(1 + 2χ−Ψ)Ψ
(2 +MwMp(−2 + γ)− (−2 + γ)γ(−1 + ρ))ρ(1 + 2χ)3
+
+
MpM2wσ
2
u((−2 + γ)(1 + γ(−1 + ρ)) + 2(−1 + γ)χ)(1 + 2χ−Ψ)Ψ
(2 +MwMp(−2 + γ)− (−2 + γ)γ(−1 + ρ))ρ(1 + 2χ)3
,
while the first-order condition for ψ yields
Ψ =
(1 + 2χ) ((ρ− 1) (γ2(ρ− 3− 2χ)− 4(1 + χ) + γ(6− 2ρ+ 4χ)))
MwMp (γ2(ρ− 1)− 4(1 + χ)2 + γ(4− 2ρ+ 4χ)) + (ρ− 1)G′
+
+
(1 + 2χ)(MwMp(γ − 2)(γ(ρ− 1) + 2(1 + χ)))
MwMp (γ2(ρ− 1)− 4(1 + χ)2 + γ(4− 2ρ+ 4χ)) + (ρ− 1)G′
,
where G′ ≡ γ2(ρ − 3 − 4χ) − 4(1 + χ)2 + γ(6 − 2ρ + 8χ) < 0. The R.H.S. of the above
expression is always larger than one for any calibration of the parameters. It turns out that
the optimal value of ψ is chosen such that the L.H.S. be at its maximum value, i.e. λ. This
is clearly obtained by setting ψ →∞.
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